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ARTICLES
MAKING THE INVISIBLE VISIBLE: EXPLORING
IMPLICIT BIAS, JUDICIAL DIVERSITY, AND THE
BENCH TRIAL
Melissa L. Breger *
ABSTRACT
All people harbor implicit biases—which by definition, are not always
consciously recognized. Although trial judges are specifically trained to
compartmentalize and shield their decisions from their own biases, implicit
biases nonetheless seep into judicial decision making. This article explores
various strategies to decrease implicit bias in bench trials. Questions are then
raised about whether a judge who has faced bias personally would be more
amenable and more open to curbing implicit bias professionally. Ultimately,
does diversifying the trial court judiciary minimize implicit bias, while also
creating a varied, multidimensional judicial voice comprised of multiple
perspectives? This article will explore this potential interplay between
diversifying the trial court judiciary and reducing implicit bias, while urging
future quantitative research.
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who invited me to present a very early iteration of this article in March 2017 during a
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Boston University’s Diversity & Law Association for inviting me to present this paper in
April 2017. I am grateful for the feedback on earlier drafts by Professors Deseriee Kennedy,
Jean Sternlight, Christine Sgarlata Chung, and Beverly Moran. Many thanks for the
excellent research assistance of Ashley Milosevic, Nicole Finn, Konstandina Tampasis, and
Robert Franklin.
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INTRODUCTION
The exploration of implicit bias is flourishing within the
academy. The particular intersection of law and implicit bias is a
burgeoning area of thought-provoking study, combining concepts
of law, legal decision making, brain science, psychology, and
human behavior.
This article contributes to the existing body of literature by
exploring implicit bias in trial courts, particularly in bench trials
with a single decision maker. It addresses courts that encounter
litigants who have appeared before the bench multiple times, such
as in family courts and criminal courts. It also presents potential
remedies for countering implicit bias in the courtroom. Ultimately,
this article suggests exploring research pertaining to judicial
diversity and its potential nexus to decreasing implicit bias in the
courtroom.
Implicit biases have been described as the thoughts and
preconceived notions that flow through our minds—often
subconsciously—pertaining to particular people, groups, or
situations. All humans harbor implicit biases in one way or
another. Thus, it follows that judges themselves are not immune
to implicit bias.1 Nonetheless, judges are specifically trained to
compartmentalize and shield their decisions from any extraneous
influences, including any of their own biases, implicit or otherwise.
“[J]udges are expected to” cull through and “transcend such
internal biases.”2
Yet, even if judges attempt to shield their decisions from their
explicit biases, implicit biases may seep into judicial decision
making.3 This could be particularly consequential in trial courts

1. Mark W. Bennett, The Implicit Racial Bias in Sentencing: The Next Frontier, 126
YALE L.J.F. 391, 393, 396 (2017) (“[I]mplicit racial bias and other implicit biases exist even,
and sometimes particularly, in egalitarian individuals. In fact, such individuals are less
likely to be aware of these implicit biases, because they lack explicit biases.”).
2. Melissa L. Breger, Introducing the Construct of the Jury into Family Violence
Proceedings and Family Court Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 25 (2006).
3. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1148
(2012); see A. Gail Prudenti, No One Is Immune from Implicit Bias, LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://libn.com/2017/12/12/prudenti-no-one-is-immune-from-implicit-bias
[https://perma.cc/D88S-NTUN].
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when juries are not utilized, or when the same litigants appear
before the same judges repeatedly.
How judges can recognize implicit bias—or even mitigate it—is
the subject of ongoing research about human behavior and its
relationship to bias. Research has identified ideas to reduce
implicit bias ranging from the simple idea of identifying implicit
bias as a reduction tool to novel ideas such as using technology,
neuroscience, and virtual paraphernalia to reduce the effects of
bias.4 This article addresses potential bias reduction remedies and
also raises the idea that perhaps a diverse judiciary would be more
prone toward reducing implicit bias.5 In other words, if a judge has
faced bias and discrimination personally, would that judge then be
more open to curbing his or her own biases professionally? If so,
perhaps this awareness and sensitivity to implicit bias is an
additional reason why diversifying the judiciary is beneficial,
beyond creating a varied, multidimensional judicial voice
comprised of multiple perspectives. This article urges further
research to explore whether there is an actual association between
a judge who has experienced bias personally and the amenability
of that judge to identify and reduce implicit bias in courtroom
decision making.
This article will address judicial diversity, implicit bias, and the
potential ways in which they may be interrelated. In Part I, the
article will provide definitions of implicit bias and cite to the
pertinent social science literature on the topic. Part II will discuss
how implicit bias impacts the legal system at the bench trial level,
how litigants may perceive potential bias, and then proffer some
suggestions for overcoming this bias. In Part III, the article
introduces the possibility that a judge who has personally been
4. See, e.g., Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 484–85 (2005); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten
Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345,
407, 411 (2007); Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from
a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 112 (2002); Antony Page, Batson’s
Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155,
237 (2005).
5. David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL
STUD. 347, 377 (2012) (“Heterogeneity across judges in sentencing by race suggests that
courtroom outcomes may not be race blind. This potential lack of partiality may be one
source of the substantial overrepresentation of African Americans in the prison population.
Understanding the sources of variation in the criminal justice system is an important first
step toward reducing disparities of various kinds.”).
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discriminated against in life could be more amenable to
eradicating his or her own implicit biases. In other words, if a judge
has faced bias on a personal level, that judge is acutely aware of
the pernicious effects of bias and may therefore be more cognizant
of his or her own personal biases in decision making. The article
then concludes with an urging for further quantitative research.
I. THE UBIQUITY OF IMPLICIT BIAS
Bias is multifaceted. Although many speak of explicit bias and
implicit bias, there are also various types of bias within and
overlapping with these categories ranging from affinity bias,6 to
confirmation bias,7 to hindsight bias,8 to stereotype bias.9 This
article will focus primarily on implicit bias in the broader general
sense.10
Implicit bias is distinct from explicit bias, but the two can
coexist. Explicit bias typically refers to prejudice that a person
6. Kathleen Nalty, Strategies for Confronting Unconscious Bias, COLO. LAW., May
2016, at 45, 46; Ronald M. Sandgrund, Can We Talk? Bias, Diversity, and Inclusiveness in
the Colorado Legal Community: Part I—Implicit Bias, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2016, at 45, 45
(“Many people automatically gravitate toward, trust, hire, and like those similar to
themselves. This is often referred to as affinity bias, which may be learned, although some
claim it has a biological component.”).
7. Bill Kanasky, Jr., Juror Confirmation Bias: Powerful, Perilous, Preventable, TRIAL
ADVOC. Q., Spring 2014, at 35, 35; Brian P. Kane, Are Cognitive Biases Impeding Your Legal
Advice Under Rule 2.1?, ADVOCATE, Oct. 2015, at 23, 24; Nalty, supra note 6, at 45–46.
8. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1400 (2006);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 571 (1998).
9. See Melissa L. Breger, Reforming by Re-Norming: How the Legal System Has the
Potential to Change a Toxic Culture of Domestic Violence, 44 J. LEGIS. 170, 180–82 (2018)
(explaining how stereotypes in regards to gender and intimate partner relationships
contribute to domestic violence being tacitly accepted in society); Anthony G. Greenwald &
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 950
(2006); Caitlin Millett, Humans Are Wired for Prejudice but That Doesn’t Have to Be the
End
of
the
Story,
CONVERSATION
(Feb.
4,
2015,
6:16
AM
EST),
http://theconversation.com/humans-are-wired-for-prejudice-but-that-doesnt-have-to-be-the
-end-of-the-story-36829 [https://perma.cc/L37C-EEY3] (“In social psychology, prejudice is
defined as an attitude toward a person on the basis of his or her group membership.”).
10. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,
94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991–93 (2004) (describing an experiment where employers were
less likely to hire resumes with African American sounding names than Caucasian
American sounding names); Kang et al., supra note 3, at 1129; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al.,
Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196–97
(2009).

BREGER 534 (DO NOT DELETE)

1044

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

5/15/2019 12:40 PM

[Vol. 53:1039

maintains outwardly towards a particular group of people.11
Examples of explicit bias might include hate crimes, the use of
racial slurs, or misogynistic or homophobic language. While much
of our society tends not to tolerate this kind of visible bias, it
nevertheless endures.12 Segments of our society, particularly in
recent times, feel justified in displaying explicit prejudice in ways
that were otherwise found unacceptable in an educated society
years earlier.13 In fact, explicit bias has become increasingly
pervasive in our society, prompting some commentators to believe
that literature and research focusing on implicit bias distract from
the prevalence of open explicit bias in our society, that still very
much exists.14
Unlike explicit biases, however, often the person holding the
implicit bias does not consciously recognize it and would deny
harboring such biases, if asked.15 Similarly, people are often
unaware of the impact of these biases upon their own decision
making.16 Implicit bias may reveal itself when individuals resort
11. Erik J. Girvan, When Our Reach Exceeds Our Grasp: Remedial Realism in
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 OR. L. REV. 359, 371 (2016).
12. Kang et al., supra note 3, at 1132–35, 1139.
13. See Girvan, supra note 11, at 371–72 (“Regular repetition of surveys on nationally
representative samples of U.S. adults show that, at least as assessed in self-reported
measures, explicit bias has declined substantially since the mid-1900s.” (footnote omitted)).
14. Cf. Olivia Goldhill, The World Is Relying on a Flawed Psychological Test to Fight
Racism, QUARTZ (Dec. 3, 2017), https://qz.com/1144504/the-world-is-relying-on-a-flawedpsychological-test-to-fight-racism/ [https://perma.cc/YG4V-9XF2] (“The implicit bias
narrative also lets us off the hook. We can’t feel as guilty or be held to account for racism
that isn’t conscious. . . . [W]e must confront the troubling reality that society is still,
disturbingly, all too consciously racist and sexist. . . . If the science behind implicit bias is
flawed, and unconscious prejudice isn’t a major driver of discrimination, then society is
likely far more consciously prejudiced than we pretend.”); Rita Cameron Wedding, Implicit
Bias: More than Just a Few Bad Apples, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (June 15, 2016),
https://jjie.org/2016/06/15/implicit-bias-more-than-just-a-few-bad-apples/ [https://perma.cc/
P8NG-MY63] (“In the absence of those more blatant and incontrovertible examples of
racism, many people think that the racism that may exist is the result of the random acts
of a few bad apples. But in this post-civil rights era racism has not disappeared. It has
merely been transformed by colorblind practices that preclude us from noticing or talking
explicitly about racism. By making conversations about race and racism taboo,
colorblindness can mask the myriad ways that race and racism function today.”).
15. See Justin D. Levinson, Introduction to IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 1,
2–3 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012); Cynthia Lee, Awareness as a First
Step Toward Overcoming Implicit Bias 290 (GWU Law Sch. Pub. Law Res., Paper No. 201756, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3011381 [https://perma.cc/CRJ7-CDDA] (“One can
honestly believe it is wrong to discriminate against others and thus have low self-reported
measures of prejudice, yet still have biased thoughts and engage in discriminatory
behavior.”).
16. Kang et al., supra note 3, at 1129.
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to preconceived notions or assumptions about particular groups,
such as those defined by gender, gender identity, race or culture,
automatically, without reflecting methodically upon what they are
actually thinking.
Even though implicit biases can be damaging, such biases are
not necessarily rooted in hate and negativity.17 At times, biased
thinking can be mistakenly construed as complimentary to a
particular group, even though the so-called “positive” stereotype
itself brings with it harm.18 Because implicit biases are not
generally deliberate or malicious, however, they can be that much
harder to identify and to eradicate.19
When implicit biases are based on stereotypes, the concepts of
stereotype bias and implicit bias are intertwined.20 What I would
call multipronged biases—in other words, biases that may fall
under a variety of categories—are even more complicated to
unravel because they involve the intersectionality of biases.21
When we engage in stereotype bias, for example, we often have
difficulty modifying our thoughts “because our perceptions become
impervious to new information. People interpret ambiguous
information to confirm stereotypes and are often unaffected by
information that a stereotype is invalid.”22
17. See Melissa L. Breger, The (In)visibility of Motherhood in Family Court
Proceedings, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 560, 565–66 (2012) (addressing implicit
biases about motherhood, that in some ways can be positive (nurturing or loving), but can
manifest negatively in legal settings); John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is
Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and
Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 42–43 (2009).
18. Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes
Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y.C. L. REV. 33, 33–35 (2009) (discussing the stereotyping of
Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians in the courtroom); Breger, supra note 17, at 565
(describing stereotypes about motherhood); Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias:
A National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 88–89, 104 (2017)
(measuring federal judges bias toward Jewish and Asian litigants as compared to Christian
and Caucasian litigants; stating that stereotypes that Asians are hardworking, for example,
can elicit hostility).
19. Breger, supra note 17, at 560. Due to the nature of implicit bias, an actor may not
realize he or she is laboring under the influence of implicit bias unless informed of its nature
and upon further reflection of its effects. Lee, supra note 15, at 291–92.
20. Jost et al., supra note 17, at 43.
21. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991).
22. Breger, supra note 9, at 180 (quoting Nicole E. Negowetti, Implicit Bias and the
Legal Profession’s “Diversity Crisis”: A Call for Self-Reflection, 15 NEV. L.J. 930, 943 (2014)).
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Moreover, it is critical to remember that the formation of biases
often start while very young in childhood, becoming hardened and
increasingly solidified over time.23 In fact, implicit biases can begin
to form in children as young as three-years old.24 Such biases are
further reinforced through institutional bias and systemic biases
in society.25 As a result, these implicit biases can shade how one
ultimately views the world.26 Even if society shuns explicit biases,
it may “reinforce[] deeply embedded constructs . . . emanating
from childhood” as implicit and persistent biases.27 Larger society
then, in effect, may perpetuate the bias.28
An example of this relationship between worldview and decision
making can be found in one particularly infamous resume
experiment.29 The resume experiment demonstrates the classic
example of implicit bias in hiring practices.30 In this psychological
For a particular example of how stereotypes have staying power in regards to gender norms,
see id. at 180–82:
It is convenient as a culture to resort to gendered stereotypes as a way to define
the role of men and women in society. Gloria Steinem notes that “[w]hen it
comes to the cult of gender, ideas are hard to challenge or even to see as open
to challenge, because they are exaggerated versions of the earliest ways we
may have been taught to see people as groups rather than as unique
individuals.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gloria Steinem, Comments on Taking Stock: A
Symposium Celebrating the New York State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts,
36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 525, 526 (2012)).
23. Levinson, supra note 4, at 363.
24. See id. On a similar note, a Yale study in 2016 found that preschool children face
implicit bias in the classroom by their preschool teachers. WALTER S. GILLIAM ET AL., YALE
CHILD STUDY CTR., DO EARLY EDUCATORS’ IMPLICIT BIASES REGARDING SEX AND RACE
RELATE TO BEHAVIOR EXPECTATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF PRESCHOOL EXPULSIONS
AND SUSPENSIONS? 3–5 (2016), https://medicine.yale.edu/childstudy/zigler/publications
/Preschool%20Implicit%20Bias%20Policy%20Brief_final_9_26_276766_5379_v1.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/V8BJ-EFVF].
25. See Jerry Kang, Communications Law: Bits of Bias, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS
ACROSS THE LAW 132, 134–45 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
26. Page, supra note 4, at 203–04 (“Children as young as three years old have already
formed stereotypes. These learned stereotypes become unconscious as a result of their
frequent presentation and, eventually, overlearning. Even as people later develop their nonprejudiced views, the original beliefs remain in the unconscious, waiting to be activated.”
(footnotes omitted)). For instance, data indicates that children exposed to intimate partner
violence at a young age create implicit bias and tendencies toward such violence. Breger,
supra note 9, at 189. They may also be more likely to either be abused by or to abuse an
intimate partner in the future. Id. at 180. Implicit bias, along with other cultural factors,
may shape the worldview of intimate relationships in these individuals. Id.
27. Breger, supra note 9, at 182–83.
28. See id. at 181.
29. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 10, at 991–92.
30. See id.
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experiment, two identical resumes were sent out to employers who
posted job openings in Boston and Chicago newspapers.31 The
resumes were identical in every way except that one set of
applications was submitted with names that many might perceive
as sounding white or Caucasian (Emily and Greg), while the other
set of applications was submitted with names that many might
perceive as sounding black or African American (Lakisha and
Jamal).32
The results were dramatic. The applicants with Caucasiansounding names received a disproportionately higher percentage
of callbacks for interviews than did the African American ones.33
Specifically, Emily and Greg received fifty percent more callbacks
for interviews than did Lakisha and Jamal.34 The statistical
reporting of the callbacks was uniform across all occupations and
industries.35 Employers who advertised themselves to be Equal
Opportunity employers discriminated just as much as the other
employers did.36
Perhaps many of the employers in the experiment would likely
not be conscious of the implicit bias that affected their decision
making.37 These employers would likely presume to be evaluating
each resume objectively. Yet in reality, their brains were reviewing
each resume through a highly personalized lens based upon their
own life experiences and their own implicit biases.38 Although the
31. Id. at 996.
32. Id. at 991–92. Throughout this article, I will generally use terms white and black
to refer to race, or African American, Asian American, Caucasian American when referring
to race. I am mindful, however, that many of these terms are not without controversy. See,
e.g., Shaila Dewan, Has ‘Caucasian’ Lost Its Meaning?, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/sunday-review/has-caucasian-lost-its-meaning.html
[https://perma.cc/5HMA-R3GH]; Adelaide Lancaster, Black Is Not a Bad Word: Why I Don’t
Talk in Code with My Children, RAISING RACE CONSCIOUS CHILD. (May 8, 2015), https://
www.raceconscious.org/2015/05/642/ [https://perma.cc/YN7F-G6TX].
33. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 10, at 997 & tbl.1, 998.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1005–06.
36. Id. at 1005.
37. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination 1–3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), https://www.nber.org/papers/w
9873.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9WS-SJ8J] (“We find little evidence that our results are driven
by employers inferring something other than race, such as social class, from the names.
These results suggest that racial discrimination is still a prominent feature of the labor
market.”).
38. Cf. Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50
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employers might think they were reviewing everything with
impartial eyes, it is more likely they were seeing things through a
biased prism.
Similar studies to the resume experiment have been replicated
in the legal realm and various other fields as well.39 Additionally,
experiments have been conducted to demonstrate implicit biases
against all types of groups.40
In another context, United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, in a 2016 speech at Georgetown Law Center,
addressed implicit gender bias:
Discrimination didn’t end with the explicit lines in the law. Some of it
went underground but a lot of it was not even conscious—the term is
unconscious bias. . . . So how do you get rid of that unconscious bias?
I’ve told many the stories about how the symphony orchestra got rid
of it. Someone had the simple but brilliant idea “let’s drop a curtain
between the people who are auditioning and the testers.” Well . . . into
the seventies you never saw women in symphony orchestras. When—

ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 196–97 (2018) (arguing that employers may have acted on explicit bias
or implicit bias, in the resume experiment).
39. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Law Is the Least Diverse Profession in the Nation. And
Lawyers Aren’t Doing Enough to Change That, WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/27/law-is-the-least-diverse-profession-inthe-nation-and-lawyers-arent-doing-enough-to-change-that/ [https://perma.cc/CX9Y-XC38]
(discussing an experiment where legal memoranda given to partners for evaluation were
skewed to favor white men).
40. Ali M. Ahmed et al., Does Age Matter for Employability? A Field Experiment on
Ageism in the Swedish Labour Market, 19 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 403, 403–05 (2012)
(studying ageism in Sweden job market); Michael Ewens et al., Statistical Discrimination
or Prejudice? A Large Sample Field Experiment, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119, 119–20 (2014)
(explaining email rental application experiment); Leo Kaas & Christian Manger, Ethnic
Discrimination in Germany’s Labour Market: A Field Experiment, 13 GER. ECON. REV. 1, 1–
3 (2012) (describing implicit bias based on ethnicity in German labor market); Lois A. Moher
& Steve W. Henson, Impact of Employee Gender and Job Congruency on Customer
Satisfaction, 5 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 161, 162 (1996) (discussing gender bias in
employment); Mason Ameri et al., The Disability Employment Puzzle: A Field Experiment
on Employer Hiring Behavior 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
21560, 2015) (describing an experiment testing implicit bias against the disabled); Magnus
Carlsson et al., Ethnic Discrimination in Hiring, Labour Market Tightness and the Business
Cycle—Evidence from Field Experiments 8 (IZA Inst. of Study of Labor, Discussion Paper
No. 11285, 2018) (discussing how biases affect tight labor markets); Magnus Carlsson &
Dan-Olof Rooth, Evidence of Ethnic Discrimination in the Swedish Labor Market Using
Experimental Data 1–3 (IZA Inst. of Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2281, 2006)
(analyzing a Swedish equivalent to the classism experiment by Rivera and Tilcsik); Lauren
Rivera & András Tilcsik, Research: How Subtle Class Cues Can Backfire on Your Resume,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/research-how-subtle-class-cuescan-backfire-on-your-resume
[https://perma.cc/R3CX-L332]
(explaining
employer
preference for wealthy class individuals when employers are determining class via hobby).
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in my growing up years there was perhaps a harp player but that was
it. When the drop curtain [at the auditions] was used there was an
almost overnight change. People who thought that they could tell the
difference between a woman playing and a man, whether it was the
violin or anything else, turned out they were all wrong. But we can’t
do that in every sphere of human activity—how good it would be if we
could.41

Presumably, Justice Ginsburg is addressing the famous orchestra
experiments conducted by researchers Goldin and Rouse about
implicit bias.42 Her observations, however, can be applied in a
myriad of other scenarios.
Implicit bias testing research gained international notoriety at
Harvard University with what is called Project Implicit and the
Implicit Association Test (“IAT”).43 The IAT is typically
computerized and tests various implicit biases by looking at splitsecond decisions one makes when one is not consciously
deliberating or reflecting.44 There are IATs for race, gender, age,
ability, religion, and all types of identities.45 Although the IAT and
similar mechanisms for testing implicit bias have garnered
criticism about whether or not they are valid instruments or

41. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks at Georgetown Law School (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?414875-1/supreme-court-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-deliver
s-remarks-georgetown-law [https://perma.cc/Q786-Q3R7].
42. Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind”
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 716 (2000).
43. Nosek et al., supra note 4, at 112 (finding that IAT research indicates that all social
groups hold implicit biases, regardless of age, gender, race, and political views); Are You
Prejudiced? Take the Implicit Association Test, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2009, 19:01 EST), https://
www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/mar/07/implicit-association-test [https://perma.cc
/69Y6-665U].
44. Lee, supra note 4, at 484–85; About the IAT, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.har
vard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html [https://perma.cc/4FY8-3F7R] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
45. Lee, supra note 4, at 484–85; see, e.g., Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for
Practitioners About Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1298 (2008); David Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit: The Law of
Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1409 (2008);
Cynthia A. McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custody, and Gender Bias in
the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 895 (1998) (examining gender stereotypes and
their relation to differences in parental roles for women and men); Joan C. Williams &
Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 78–79 (2003) (addressing the
difficulties family caregivers experience at work, like the “glass ceiling” and “maternal
wall,” due to bias against caregiver status).
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accurately test for implicit bias,46 the IAT remains a robust tool in
research and is utilized by many psychologists.47
At times, the IAT is used in conjunction with or within other
experiments,48 as it was used in one study to explore empathic
responses to others.49 In one such experiment, individuals of
various races viewed pain stimuli in members of their same race.50
Researchers then compared such responses to those observed when
the subjects viewed pain stimuli in members of a different race.51
Videos were shown to the sample members depicting a person’s
hand of the same race as that of the subjects being injected with a
needle, and then the same action upon a person’s hand of a
different race than that of the subjects.52 Just as humans have
physiological reactions to feeling pain, not surprisingly, humans
have physiological reactions to witnessing others’ pain.53 Thus,
during the viewing of the videos, the sample group was measured
physiologically for their reaction to the video stimuli of others in
pain.54 Thereafter, each viewer of the video was given the IAT.55
The results of the physiological test and the IAT correlated for
those individuals of one race having an increased sensitivity or
46. Beth Azar, IAT: Fad or Fabulous? Psychologists Debate Whether the Implicit
Association Test Needs More Solid Psychometric Footing Before It Enters the Public Sphere,
39 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 44, 46 (2008); cf. Selmi, supra note 38, at 215 (“By design, the IAT
requires instantaneous decisions with response times measured in milliseconds. Very few
real-world decisions, however, occur in that way. Most, but not all, are the product of
deliberation and a number of scholars have emphasized that explicit bias measures likely
provide more accurate predictors of deliberate behavior than implicit bias measures, which
are more closely connected to spontaneous behavior.”).
47. See JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 4 (2009), https://
www.courts.ca.gov/documents/BTB_XXII_WEDF_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U2N-4PU6]; see
also Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or “Would Jesse
Jackson ‘Fail’ the Implicit Association Test?,” 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257, 261–64, 266 (2004);
Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1031 (2006).
48. See, e.g., Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 417, 427 (2011) (referencing a second primary method of measuring implicit bias,
evaluative priming, in which “participants are briefly exposed to a subliminal or
supraliminal prime (e.g., photographs of [faces of different races]), and then asked to make
decisions about whether certain words are negative or positive”).
49. Alessio Avenanti et al., Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Resonance
with Other-Race Pain, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1018, 1018–20 (2010).
50. Id. at 1018–19.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1018.
53. Id. at 1018–20.
54. Id. at 1018–19.
55. Id. at 1019–20.
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reaction to members of their same race, and having less so for
members of a different race.56
It is important to note that the IAT and other experiments test
the existence of implicit biases, not the likelihood of such
individuals acting on those biases.57 Thus, “the IAT ‘do[es] not
measure actions. The [IAT], for example, does not measure racism
as much as a race bias.’ Professor Banaji ‘tells . . . volunteers who
show biases [on the IAT] that it does not mean they will always act
in biased ways—people can consciously override their biases.’”58
Likewise, other experiments have found that participants’
reactions did not necessarily correlate to their explicit attitudes
once surveyed.59 Thus, while the test results yield the realities of
implicit biases, they also demonstrate that despite the apparent
nature of biases, they are not necessarily determinative of
behavior.
II. IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
As noted, implicit bias is omnipresent. Every person who has
grown up in any society has some implicit bias or biases, conscious
or not. Thus, juries have biases, litigants in the courtroom have
biases, and court personnel have biases.
Judges are not immune to implicit bias either,60 even if trained
to compartmentalize information and transcend their own biases.61
56. Id. Notably, I was unable to find a study that addressed experiments with
multiracial testers or hands.
57. Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal
System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1571 (2013).
58. Id. (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Shankar Vedantam, See No
Bias, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/maga
zine/2005/01/23/see-no-bias/a548dee4-4047-4397-a253-f7f780fae575/ [https://perma.cc/CA9
W-7QXN]).
59. See, e.g., Natalie Salmanowitz, Unconventional Methods for a Traditional Setting:
The Use of Virtual Reality to Reduce Implicit Racial Bias in the Courtroom, 15 U. N.H. L.
REV. 117, 125–26 (2016).
60. Bennett, supra note 1, at 397 (“In my recent national empirical study, I found that
92% of senior federal district judges, 87% of non-senior federal district judges, 72% of U.S.
magistrate judges, 77% of federal bankruptcy judges, and 96% of federal probation and pretrial services officers ranked themselves in the top 25% of respective colleagues in their
ability to make decisions free from racial bias. Again, mathematically impossible.” (footnote
omitted)).
61. One study conducted by the National Center for State Courts, which looked at
implicit bias within the judicial systems of forty-two states, found that judges in most
jurisdictions “reached unfair decisions on the basis of personal characteristics such as
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Therefore, the court system as a whole—an institution comprised
of human beings—needs to address human characteristics, such as
implicit biases.62 Implicit bias “is the kind of bias that judges,
caseworkers, or lawyers may employ, yet not even be aware that
they are doing so. Regardless of intentions, however, implicit bias
in the courtroom can be nonetheless harmful to litigants.”63
Studies have shown that implicit bias plays various roles in the
legal system and the administration of justice on a number of
levels.64
Benjamin Cardozo in his essay, The Nature of the Judicial
Process,
analyzed the ingredients of “that strange compound which is brewed
daily in the cauldron of the courts . . . .” Among these ingredients, he
distinguished between the judge’s conscious and subconscious
decision making. Whereas the conscious element comprises “guiding
principles of conduct,” the subconscious element is much more elusive,
encompassing the judge’s inherited instincts, traditional beliefs and
acquired convictions. Like the conscious component, the judge’s
subconscious is inseparable from her decisions. Cardozo writes that,
while “[w]e [as judges] may try to see things as objectively as we
please . . . we can never see them with any eyes except our own.”

gender.” Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe: Practical Methods
for Neutralizing Harmful Biases, 42 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 1, 13 (2006). Following these
results, thirty-four states released reports that contained recommendations to eradicate the
effects of bias on judicial decisions. Id.
62. Some studies suggest that judges hold the same biases as everyone else and this
can be mitigated if they are aware of such biases. See, e.g., Rachlinski et al., supra note 10,
at 1221; cf. Selmi, supra note 38, at 210–11 (discussing the reluctance of voters, when asked,
to express views that would be identified as racist or sexist, also known as “the Bradley
Effect”).
63. Breger, supra note 17, at 565. The behaviors of implicit bias can range from minor,
such as acts of courtesy, to more severe such as how one assesses an individual’s work. Id.
at 561. Either way, however, the effects of implicit bias can be harmful. For instance, a
judge holding implicit bias about what a “bad” mother should be, could result in a mother
having her child put in foster care or later having her rights terminated. Id. at 565–67. The
judge may have an untenable standard of “mother” to live up to and “[c]ompound this with
issues of poverty and lack of resources, along with race and age, and now you have a litigant
facing a system that expects her to fail before she even walks into the courtroom.” Id. at
572. In addition, “[i]f a judge believes the litigant in the courtroom has not mothered
appropriately, it is much easier to agree with the child welfare agency that intervention or
continued intervention is necessary.” Id. at 567. Perhaps this is an explanation for why the
majority of people accused of engaging in abuse or neglect are mothers. Id. at 571.
64. See, e.g., Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 9, at 951, 966–67; cf. Schuette v. Coal.
to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 381 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject
of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries
of racial discrimination.”).
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Furthermore, “[i]t is often through these subconscious forces that
judges are kept consistent with themselves, and inconsistent with one
another.”65

When one is a judge and a sole finder of fact, even if the decision
maker is unaware that bias could be shaping the outcome, the
consequences can be serious.66 Thus, it follows that “[t]he existence
of unconscious bias carries a potentially powerful impact in legal
proceedings, where the public has put its trust in the judicial
system to achieve a fair result.”67
Ideally, the law should endeavor to avoid decisions based upon
biases, because “[t]he law serves as a normalizing force in society,
delineating what society will tolerate and what is permissible
under the law. In this sense, the law informs and reflects society’s
culture.”68 Thus, the law can serve as a conduit of change within
society.69
Professor Jerry Kang, one of the pioneers researching implicit
bias in the law, has addressed how the nature of a courtroom and
litigation poses unique issues with regard to bias. Kang
emphasizes the critical importance of a judge’s role in countering
bias:
Americans view the court system as the single institution that is most
unbiased, impartial, fair, and just. Yet, a typical trial courtroom
setting mixes together many people, often strangers, from different
social backgrounds, in intense, stressful, emotional, and sometimes
hostile contexts. In such environments, a complex jumble of implicit
and explicit biases will inevitably be at play. It is the primary
responsibility of the judge and other court staff to manage this
complex and bias-rich social situation to the end that fairness and
justice be done—and be seen to be done.70

Professor Kang highlights the importance of the players in the
courtroom being aware of and educated about implicit bias.71 As

65. Masua Sagiv, Cultural Bias in Judicial Decision Making, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST.
229, 232 (2015) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10–13 (1921)).
66. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330–31 (1987).
67. Bassett, supra note 57, at 1576.
68. Breger, supra note 9, at 185.
69. Id. at 189.
70. KANG, supra note 47, at 6.
71. Id. at 5–6.
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Kang notes: “[g]iven the critical importance of exercising fairness
and equality in the court system, lawyers, judges, jurors, and staff
should be particularly concerned about identifying such
possibilities.”72 Several other researchers highlight the concerns of
judicial bias in the courtroom and suggest ways we might combat
such bias, as will be discussed later in this article.73
Similarly, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) has recognized
that a judge’s awareness of bias serves as a key factor in
diminishing the role that bias will play in the courtroom.74 In
response to this finding, the ABA has initiated a program to
expand judicial consciousness of implicit biases and has initiated
three pilot judicial education programs in California, North
Dakota, and Minnesota to address the issue.75
While jurors and juries have their own biases,76 this article is
operating from the presumption that six or twelve personal biases
can diffuse and counter each other in ways that just cannot apply
to a single fact finder.77 Yet, while this article focuses specifically
upon bench trials and single finders of fact, it certainly does not
deny the problems and inevitability of jury bias.
Influential research about implicit bias and the judiciary was
conducted by two Cornell University professors, a Vanderbilt law
professor, and a federal judge (hereinafter “Rachlinski Study”).78
The researchers tried to test courtroom implicit bias over a span of
years, specifically with regard to criminal court trial judges.79 The
researchers wrote an article entitled Does Unconscious Racial Bias

72. Id. at 2.
73. See, e.g., Kang et al., supra note 3, at 1172–79.
74. Bassett, supra note 57, at 1580.
75. Id.
76. Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, ILL. B.J., Jan. 2014, at 41–42
[hereinafter Hyman, Implicit Bias]; Michael B. Hyman, Reining In Implicit Bias, ILL. B.J.,
July 2017, at 26, 28 [hereinafter Hyman, Reining In]; Peter A. Joy, Race Matters in Jury
Selection, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 180, 180–81 (2015) (discussing racial bias in regards
to jurors and how this affects jury selection); Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection
and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 830–31 (2012).
77. See Breger, supra note 2, at 23–24. See generally Hyman, Implicit Bias, supra note
76, at 40 (discussing implicit bias in judges and juries); Hyman, Reining In, supra note 76,
at 26, 28 (emphasizing implicit bias and its effects on lawyers and judges); Joy, supra note
76, at 180–81; Roberts, supra note 76, at 830–33.
78. Rachlinski et al., supra note 10, at 1195.
79. Id. at 1197.
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Affect Trial Judges? and ultimately concluded that the answer was
“Yes.”80
These researchers conducted a multipart study involving a
sample of trial judges drawn from around the country.81 The
results demonstrated that judges do harbor the same kinds of
implicit biases as others, which can thereby influence their
judgment.82 Yet, the data also shows that given sufficient
motivation, judges can compensate for the influence of these biases
by remaining aware and vigilant about these biases.83 As the
researchers noted:
First, implicit biases are widespread among judges. Second, these
biases can influence their judgment. Finally, judges seem to be aware
of the potential for bias in themselves and possess the cognitive skills
necessary to avoid its influence. When they are motivated to avoid the
appearance of bias, and face clear cues that risk a charge of bias, they
can compensate for implicit bias.84

Implicit biases often present themselves as what some may call
intuition rather than deliberation.85 Intuition has been referred to
as “the likely pathway by which undesirable influences, like the
race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect the legal system.”86
The ability of judges to overcome the overuse of intuition “may
require years of ‘effortful study’ as well as accurate and reliable
80. Id. at 1221.
81. Id. at 1205–06.
82. Id. at 1197.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1225.
85. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW passim (2011); Andrew J. Wistrich
& Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making: How It Affects Judgment
and What Judges Can Do About It, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 87, 90 (Sarah
E. Redfield ed., 2017) (“Intuitive decision making consists of relying on one’s first instinct.
Intuition is emotional. It relies on close associations and rapid, shallow cognitive processing.
Intuitively, if a choice sounds right and feels right, then it is the right choice. Psychologists
sometimes refer to this style of decision making as System 1 reasoning. System 1 produces
rapid, effortless, confident judgments and operates outside conscious awareness. When we
go with our gut, we decide quickly and feel that we are right. But human beings did not
develop advanced civilizations with System 1. Human beings, of course, have an enormous
capacity for higher-order deliberative reasoning. Mathematics, deductive logic, and
analogical reasoning require much more than simple intuition. Psychologists sometimes
refer to higher-order reasoning as System 2. System 2 is slower and conscious. It requires
effort, and if we are distracted, rushed, or tired, we use System 2 less. Oddly, when the two
conflict, people have less faith in System 2 than in System 1. But System 2 is where logic—
and hence most legal reasoning—lies.” (footnote omitted)).
86. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 31–32 (2007) (footnote omitted).
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feedback on earlier judgments[,]” but conscious dedication to
greater utilization of deliberation over intuition can limit bias in
the courtroom as well.87 As said by Benjamin Cardozo:
There is in each of us a stream of tendency whether you choose to call
it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought
and action. Judges cannot escape that current any more than other
mortals. All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot
name, have been tugging at them—inherited instincts, traditional
beliefs, acquired convictions . . . .88

The Rachlinski Study investigated whether the IAT test could
ascertain judicial implicit bias, and if those biases would impact
judicial decisions.89 The sample of judges completed an IAT around
the issue of race and also decided mock-court scenarios, where an
actor was prepared to act out what some might perceive as
“stereotypical roles” associated with African American and
Caucasian American individuals.90 The results showed that the
IAT did predict decisions when the actor was prepped to act in socalled stereotypical roles.91 In fact, when the defendant actors were
presenting in a so-called stereotypical African American
individual’s role, the judges who scored more towards racial
implicit biases in the IAT test levied stricter sentences upon the
defendants.92
Had these trials been real instead of mock trials, the results
would have been devastating. In fact, these are real judges. Thus,
the Rachlinski Study offers an example of how its research plays
out in real judicial decisions: research showing that implicit bias
by judges is one reason why African American93 criminal
defendants fare worse in the courtroom than similarly situated
Caucasian American criminal defendants.94
87.
88.

Id.
Sagiv, supra note 65, at 230 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921)).
89. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 10, at 1197, 1208.
90. Id. at 1208.
91. Id. at 1209, 1210 & tbl.2.
92. Id.; see also Justin D. Levinson et al., Implicit Racial Bias, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS
ACROSS THE LAW 22 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
93. One researcher suggests that harsher sentences are often given to those defendants
who either are of persons of color, or share facial and other appearance characteristics
associated with being a person of color, regardless if the defendant is actually a person of
color. Bennett, supra note 1, at 403.
94. Rachlinski et al., supra note 10, at 1196.
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Another study conducted by researchers Matthew Clair and Alix
Winter further reveals how judges’ implicit biases can lead to a
disproportionate impact on racial minorities in the courtroom.95
The results show that judges, “despite well-intentioned judging,”96
by “acknowledg[ing], and attempt[ing] to account for, their implicit
biases,” may still contribute to disparate treatment of minority
litigants by failing to take into account, during the decisionmaking process, potential systematic disparities that the minority
litigant likely encountered at earlier stages of litigation.97 Thus,
“racial inequality is reproduced in subtle, contextually specific
ways.”98
A. Remedies and Unique Aspect of Bench Trials
As noted, recognition of implicit bias is a key factor to
minimizing implicit biases;99 if one is cognizant about implicit bias,
then one can work to counter it.100 Psychological data repeatedly
supports the proposition that both being aware of one’s own
implicit bias and also being willing to change it actually lessens
the effect of the bias.101
Yet, bias is also hard to alter and contextualize. When we talk
about bias, it is essential to understand how potential bias may
arise in a given situation or a given case. If facts are conveyed to a
judge, such facts are absorbed through the lens of the judge’s
worldview.102 Therefore, if we can have diversity in the context of
95. See Matthew Clair & Alix S. Winter, How Judges Think About Racial Disparities:
Situational Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 332, 353
(2016).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 354.
98. Id.
99. Marouf, supra note 48, at 447–48 (“Judges must become aware of the impact of
implicit bias in order to question the soundness of their decisions and make the effort to
render more impartial judgments. Reforms such as ‘exposing judges to stereotypeincongruent models, providing testing and training, auditing judicial decisions, and altering
courtroom practices’ could all help reduce implicit bias.” (footnote omitted)).
100. Lawrence, supra note 66, at 331 (“[W]e must take cognizance of psychological theory
in order to frame a legal theory that can address that affliction.”).
101. Rachlinski et al., supra note 10, at 1221.
102. Levinson, supra note 4, at 353–54, 407 (“[J]urors . . . and . . . judges . . .
misremember case facts in racially biased ways. These racially biased memory errors will
distort case facts in ways that are completely unknown to the juror but prejudicial to the
legal actor . . . . [D]ebiasing and cultural solutions . . . approaches hold promise that implicit
memory bias may someday be significantly reduced or even eliminated.”).
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the judiciary, this awareness could ultimately promote fairer
decision making and more productive court proceedings.103
There are various methods to raise awareness about bias,
including the use of metrics to track case outcomes and employing
“bias interrupters” to audit performance, as will be discussed
further.104
As suggested by researchers John Irwin and Daniel Real:
Judicial decisions could be reviewed by a diverse group of auditors to
look for signs of implicit biases’ influences. Jurisdictions could adopt
a sort of peer-review process to evaluate decisions for effective
impartiality and provide feedback. Even without utilizing diverse
auditors or peer-review programs, providing judges with statistical
data and breakdowns concerning past decisions will allow an
individual assessment of trends and influences of implicit biases.105

In the judiciary, this methodology may yield positive results.106
For example, a study completed by the National Center for State
Courts demonstrated that teaching judges about both the source
and the effects of bias are initial steps to ensuring courtrooms with
a reduction in bias.107

103. KATHERINE W. PHILLIPS, SCI. AM., HOW DIVERSITY WORKS 43 (2014), https://www.
scientificamerican.com/index.cfm/_api/render/file/?method=inline&amp;fileID=9F4FCDB9
-A5B3-40AB-A9A525FDC71156AB [https://perma.cc/ZL6R-MCK7] (“Decades of research by
organizational scientists, psychologists, sociologists, economists and demographers show
that socially diverse groups (that is, those with a diversity of race, ethnicity, gender and
sexual orientation) are more innovative, than homogeneous groups.”); see also Elaine
Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive la Difference?, 73 JUDICATURE 204, 204 (1990).
Differences have been found between male and female state supreme court justices with
respect to age, localism, and career patterns. See Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender and
Racial Diversification of State Supreme Courts, 24 WOMEN & POL. 35, 39–40 (2002).
104. See Joan C. Williams, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, An Empirical Look at Implicit Bias and
Bias Interrupters in the Legal Profession at the New York State Bar 2017 Annual Meeting,
in NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 2017 ANNUAL MEETING (Jan. 26, 2017), https://
www.nysba.org/AM2017IMPLICITBIAS/ [https://perma.cc/NA9Y-GD5J]; Midyear 2016:
Bias Interrupter Can Help Advance Legal Profession Diversity, Says Researcher, (Feb. 2,
2016), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2016/02/midyear_
2016_biasi/ [https://perma.cc/86DS-ZGHY].
105. John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial DecisionMaking: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
106. Letter from John S. Kiernan to Judge Betty Weinberg Ellerin (Aug. 25, 2016), in
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 2017 ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 104.
107. RACHEL D. GODSIL ET AL., PERCEPTION INST., THE SCIENCE OF EQUALITY, VOLUME
1: ADDRESSING IMPLICIT BIAS, RACIAL ANXIETY, AND STEREOTYPE THREAT IN EDUCATION
AND HEALTH CARE 47 (2014), https://equity.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Scienceof-Equality-Vol.-1-Perception-Institute-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH2K-25Q3].
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The idea of judges contending with personal explicit biases is
nothing new. There is an entire body of literature about how judges
must face the challenges of their own biases as well as the overall
biases that exist in the legal system.108 One author even posits that
“[j]udges have the most intractable bias of all: the bias of believing
they are without bias.”109
Yet, the study of implicit biases among judges is still developing.
In fact, the Rachlinski Study showed that ninety-seven percent of
judges asked in a survey believed that they were in the top twentyfive percent of judges avoiding racial prejudice in the courtroom as
compared to the other thirty-six conference attendees.110 There is
clearly a disconnect here in terms of how these judges perceive
their own freedom from biases as compared to others, and what is
even numerically possible.111 As Judge Bernard Shientag notes:
by failing to appreciate [the universality of implicit bias], many judges
are lulled into a false sense of security. . . . [P]rogress will be made
only when judges recognize this condition as part of the weakness of
human nature. Then, “[h]aving admitted the liability to prejudice,
unconscious for the most part, subtle and nebulous at times, the next
step is to determine what the judge, with his trained mind, can do to
neutralize the incessant play of these obscure yet potent
influences.”112

Decision makers treating bias with intentionality may very well
decrease the chance of bias affecting a decision. As Justice Hyman
of Illinois notes, “[j]udges mindful of their ability to discriminate
and determined to avoid it may be able to counteract their implicit
bias.”113 Again, having judges be very deliberate about the work of
implicit biases may help deter their biases from entering into the
decision-making process.114

108. See Bassett, supra note 57, at 1564; Breger, supra note 2, at 19; Kang et al., supra
note 3, at 1181; Roberts, supra note 76, at 832; Selmi, supra note 38, at 228–29.
109. KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATING DANGEROUSLY: THE FRONTIERS OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 13 (2001).
110. Rachlinski et al., supra note 10, at 1225.
111. Kang et al., supra note 3, at 1172.
112. Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?, 28 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 507, 510–11 (1990) (quoting Bernard L. Shientag, The Virtue of Impartiality, in
HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 58 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 1975)); see also Breger, supra note 2, at
23 (finding that some judges even prefer juries to insulate themselves against accusations
of bias).
113. Hyman, Implicit Bias, supra note 76, at 40.
114. Cf. Selmi, supra note 38, at 230 (“Again, this is not a simple proposition. Increasing
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As stated earlier, there are a multitude of ways in which implicit
biases may play out in cases, such as what the Rachlinski Study
and others note, in criminal sentencing matters.115 Judges at all
levels must address biases and preconceived notions of litigants
who appear before them.116 In an ideal world, countering bias
would be an ongoing daily process, but as a practical matter,
fighting bias may often fall lower on the priority list due to
substantial dockets and the emotional toll of tough cases.117 This
is a salient aspect of most busy, urban trial courts, particularly
criminal and family courts, where there are lengthy dockets,
difficult issues, repeat players, and often quick decision making
from the bench.118
As noted by now retired Judge Richard Neely: “[t]here is . . .
always an element of human judgment that enters any
complicated case, which is why the process traditionally calls upon
the organized collective intelligence of a trial court judge, [a] trial

awareness is likely to have the strongest effect on those who are receptive to the notion that
implicit bias is a real issue, and that discrimination remains a pervasive societal force. In
contrast, increasing awareness is likely to have little effect on those who resist the very
concept of implicit bias.”). But cf. Tryon P. Woods, The Implicit Bias of Implicit Bias Theory,
10 DREXEL L. REV. 631, 640 (2018) (“To wit, if racism is so deeply ingrained as to constitute
the unconscious, then why would we expect a program of rational consciousness-raising
about implicit bias to effectuate changes in the unconscious?”).
115. Rachlinski et al., supra note 10, at 1214–16.
116. Gregory S. Parks, Judicial Recusal: Cognitive Biases and Racial Stereotyping, 18
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 696 (2015) (“[E]ven where there is a black judge/black
litigant dynamic—the judge should consider the possibility of his or her own subconscious
bias in deciding whether to recuse him- or herself.”).
117. Bennett, supra note 1, at 394 (“[W]here courtroom participants are overwhelmed
with more cases than proper resources, such conditions create a rich environment for
systemic implicit racial biases to thrive and infect every aspect of courtroom criminal
proceedings.”); see Marouf, supra note 48, at 436 (regarding immigration courts) (“Lustig’s
survey of IJs reveals shockingly high levels of burnout and low motivation. Overall, the
responses received from fifty-nine IJs demonstrated ‘significant symptoms of secondary
traumatic stress.’ Many IJs ‘reported that the work was emotionally draining.’” (quoting
Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National
Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 57,
74 (2008))).
118. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT
BIAS 1–2 (2012), https://horsley.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/IB_Strategies_033012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BRY-EGZZ] (detailing research that suggests that when judges are in
highly emotional states and forced to engage in low effort decision making there is an
increased risk of a decision made under the influence of implicit bias). Although this article
is focusing on implicit bias based upon characteristics or identify of litigants, this author
has earlier suggested that the risk of judicial bias in another way can be seen if the same
judge has presided over other parts of cases in that same family. Breger, supra note 2, at
18.
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jury, and at least one appellate court.”119 The human judgment
aspect can be even trickier and more problematic when the same
trier of fact deals with the same family year after year, particularly
as that family encounters multiple crises.120 This is a situation that
is not uncommon in family law cases, because many states have
“One Family, One Judge” paradigms, which allows one judge to
preside over a multitude of cases involving the same family
members.121 Furthermore, family court proceedings generally lack
juries.122 While having one finder of fact has multiple benefits, such
as making decisions holistically and fully, and potentially
increasing the speed of the process and reducing the expenditure
of judicial resources, having one finder of fact may also create
unique circumstances in which implicit biases can more readily
manifest.123 The judge may then have bias arising from both legal
and factual knowledge of the cases that a different judge or a jury
may lack.124 A family court judge, for example, may be constantly

119. State v. Morgan Stanley, 459 S.E.2d 906, 914, 921 (W. Va. 1995).
120. See Breger, supra note 2, at 17–18; e.g., In re Jamal S., 809 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (App.
Div. 2006) (finding that the lower court committed reversible error when it refused to
conduct a separate Mapp hearing prior to commencement of the fact-finding hearing). The
court concluded that the error
cannot be deemed harmless under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Even though it is true that a judge, by reason of learning, experience, and
judicial discipline, is uniquely capable of distinguishing the issues and making
an objective determination based upon appropriate legal criteria, despite
awareness of facts which cannot properly be relied upon in making the
decision, in this case, the evidence adduced on the fact-finding and suppression
issues was so intertwined that it cannot be determined what evidence the
Family Court relied upon in making its determinations, and effective appellate
review is therefore precluded.
Id. (citations omitted).
121. See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, ONE FAMILY, ONE
JUDGE: EVALUATING A RESOURCE GUIDELINE’S “BEST PRACTICE” (2013), https://www.ncjfcj.
org/sites/default/files/One%20Family%20One%20Judge%20Snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5VYX-WN5H].
122. Breger, supra note 2, at 2; Breger, supra note 17, at 571.
123. See Breger, supra note 2, at 30–33. Several researchers have proposed making
jurors aware of their own implicit bias by educating in various proposed ways with the hope
that it will lead to less bias in juries. See Roberts, supra note 76, at 830–31; Kang et al.,
supra note 3, at 1181–84.
124. See Breger, supra note 2, at 17–18; Sherilynn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench:
Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 444–45 (2000)
(“Jurors, who serve only once a year or every two years at most, may be better able
temporarily to suspend familiar stereotypes and judgments about facts than can judges.
Judges, especially trial judges who face an overloaded docket of cases each day, may be more
likely unconsciously to fall back on the stereotypes and stories, which we all use as a
shorthand to categorize people and events in our lives.” (footnotes omitted)).
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exposed to the same family for multiple crises spanning across
many years and possibly generations.125 The litigants recount
intimate details in front of the same judge.126 Compare this to a
jury, which would be unaware of the previous family law issues
before the court without any preconceived notions about the
litigants.127
Biases, including implicit biases, are not necessarily negative in
every context, but can still be negative upon application in a trial
court setting. In another example borrowed from family law, this
author has previously written about the dangers of “implicit
motherhood bias”—which, while on its face may seem positive (e.g.,
mothers as nurturing caregivers)—can then be damaging as
applied in the courtroom (e.g., mothers as all-knowing, all-loving
selfless creatures—anyone less is neglectful).128 As Dr. Cameron
Wedding notes, when training judges nationwide, implicit biases,
even when not malicious, can impact judicial decision making in
subtle ways, such as in “assessments of risk . . . [and] differential
application of policies and procedures.”129
Another issue that comes into play in busy, urban courts with
emotionally laden facts is that such intense cases “may not
resonate to the same degree to a factfinder who has heard ‘the
same story’ before.”130 Judges are not immune from becoming jaded
or skeptical after years of hearing traumatic stories.131
Furthermore, the issues that are often raised in many trial
courts, such as in criminal and family courts, may fundamentally
arise out of poverty or lack of resources on the part of litigants.
This sets up a distinction between a litigant and a judge, in that a
litigant may believe that a judge from a different cultural, racial,
sexual, or socioeconomic background would be unprepared to
grapple with certain issues that arise in the case, even if that were
not actually true.132 With regard to socioeconomic status, it is well125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Breger, supra note 2, at 17.
Id. at 17–18, 23, 27.
See id. at 22–23.
Breger, supra note 17, at 573–74.
Wedding, supra note 14.
Breger, supra note 2, at 22.
Id.
Id. at 25. For instance, this can arise in domestic violence cases. See LINDA C.
FENTIMAN, BLAMING MOTHERS 46 (2017) (“[S]ome judges may not believe female witnesses,
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established that a judge’s income is generally much higher than
that of the average American’s income, and “[l]ike all people,
judges are influenced by their economic backgrounds.”133 Some
researchers have argued that due to common economic disparities
between judges and litigants, it often becomes difficult for a judge
to fully understand the hardships faced by indigent litigants.134
The difference in economic status between judges and litigants has
not gone unnoticed, and the public is increasingly equating wealth
with the ability to obtain fairness in American courts. A recent survey
by the National Center for State Courts found that Californians
believe the level of fairness in state courts is least for those with low
incomes and non-English speakers. Nationally, 62% of Americans
believe the courts favor the wealthy.135

Thus, even if it is not the case that many judges may, in fact, favor
the wealthy, it is still a perception held by a wide swath of the
population.
Some judges are already keenly aware of how personal
experiences may impact how a judge views a particular case. For
example, Judge Graffeo, a former judge on the New York State
Court of Appeals, stated:
I think many people underestimate to what extent people bring their
personal philosophy and life experiences to cases, and I think that’s
true whether you’re on the trial bench or whether you’re on the
appellate bench. Judges are still people. They have their own value
systems, they have their own professional experiences, they have
their own life experiences. That’s the lens through which they
examine the facts of a case. So, when you have people of different
economic backgrounds, different ethnic, racial, gender, whatever, I
think that it brings a different richness to the discussion.136

especially victims of domestic violence, because they cannot conceive of themselves in that
situation.” (citing Diane P. Wood, Sex Discrimination in Law and Life, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 1, 5–6)); Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process:
Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 252–53 (1993).
133. Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
137, 142 (2013).
134. Id.; see FENTIMAN, supra note 132, at 45–46 (noting that most judges come from
privileged backgrounds, often different from the litigants appearing before them); Joy
Milligan, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions About
Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 1229 (2006) (“[J]udges of different racial and
ethnic backgrounds are likely to be more familiar with the reasoning and experiences
underlying views commonly held within their particular communities.”).
135. Neitz, supra note 133, at 143.
136. Interview by John Caher with Victoria A. Graffeo, Former Assoc. Judge, N.Y. State
Court of Appeals, at Albany Law School (Oct. 27, 2016), https://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/def
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B. Litigant Perceptions About Bias in the Courtroom
For the legal system to remain a respectable institution, a
litigant’s sense of justice should not be eroded, as addressed more
fully in the next part. A litigant may perceive that a judge is
biased, even when that bias does not exist.137 “In the mindset of the
litigants, it may be impossible for a single jurist to purge her mind
of previously formed impressions of the litigants, witnesses, and
their families, especially if they have appeared before this same
trier of fact in other proceedings.”138
As a result, litigants may prefer finders of fact who have lived
experiences similar to their own.139 In earlier research, I have
addressed the subject of litigants and procedural justice and how
litigants may feel more obliged to comport with court orders,
believe that justice was fairly served, or feel their voices have been
heard if they believe that the legal system has treated them
fairly.140 This could be especially applicable in cases of family law
or criminal law, where so much is at stake.
In 2016, the New York State Bar Association (“NYSBA”) more
deeply explored litigants’ perspectives of court systems. In doing
so, the NYSBA examined litigants’ perceptions of those who work
in the justice system, such as judges and attorneys.141 The study
found some dissonance between the legal system and the litigants,
particularly when these litigants felt “othered” by their identity or
role in contrast to the majority of the decision makers in the
courtroom, such as the lawyers and the judges.142 Thus, it is
ault/files/document/files/2018-04/VGraffeo10-27-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BPS-D6XM].
137. Breger, supra note 2, at 19–26.
138. Id. at 23.
139. See Breger, supra note 17, at 577–78.
140. Id. at 577 (“[A] particular female litigant may construe bias from a court, child
welfare agency, or lawyer, even if it is not consciously intended. This sense that bias exists
is especially probable when a female litigant recognizes the power imbalance between
herself and those who work in ‘the system’ and are deciding the ultimate fate of her family
and whether her family will be able to stay together.”); see Breger, supra note 2, at 19–21.
141. Letter from John S. Kiernan to Judge Betty Weinberg Ellerin, supra note 106.
142. Id.; see Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender
Equity in Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1041 (2011); see also Wilson, supra
note 112, at 512 (“[S]tudies confirm that male judges tend to adhere to traditional values
and beliefs about the natures of men and women and their proper roles in society. The
studies show overwhelming evidence that gender-based myths, biases, and stereotypes are
deeply embedded in the attitudes of many male judges, as well as in the law itself.
Researchers have concluded that gender difference has been a significant factor in judicial
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important to keep in mind that litigants may be concerned about
judicial implicit bias, whether or not it actually exists.
C. Exploring Ways to Minimize or Counter Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom
The promising news is that there are some fairly
straightforward strategies to lessen implicit bias in the judiciary.
As noted above, if one is committed to countering biases, then one
can work to decrease them. Data has consistently replicated and
validated that the first step in minimizing implicit biases is to be
aware and cognizant of one’s own biases.143 As addressed earlier,
this can be accomplished in a number of ways within any
organization, such as IAT test taking.144
While some scholars would argue that judges may only reduce
bias by explicitly announcing their biases and prejudices before
appearing on a case,145 other scholars believe that there are less
drastic measures. For example, states such as New York,
Minnesota, and California have required sitting judges and
practicing lawyers to include credit hours of diversity and inclusion
training to eliminate bias as part of continuing legal education,
required to continue practicing law.146 This issue was raised
nationally at the ABA meeting in February 2016 in the form of
Resolution 107, which was approved unanimously by the ABA
House of Delegates.147 The report on Resolution 107 in relevant
part:
encourages all state, territorial and tribal courts, bar associations and
other licensing and regulatory authorities that currently require
decision-making, particularly in the areas of tort law, criminal law, and family law. Further,
many have concluded that sexism is the unarticulated underlying premise of many
judgments in these areas, and that this is not really surprising having regard to the nature
of the society in which the judges themselves have been socialized.” (citing N.J. Wikler, On
the Judicial Agenda for the 80s: Equal Treatment for Men and Women in the Courts, 64
JUDICATURE 202 (1980))); Rhode, supra note 39.
143. See Lee, supra note 15, at 291; Woods, supra note 114, at 635, 637.
144. See Williams, supra note 104.
145. LINDA G. MILLS, A PENCHANT FOR PREJUDICE: UNRAVELING BIAS IN JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING 22–23 (1999).
146. See EILEEN M. LETTS & DAVID B. WOLFE, AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 107, at 1–2
(2016); Katherine Suchocki, New CLE Requirement: Diversity & Inclusion and Elimination
of Bias in Legal Profession, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Seco
ndaryStandard.aspx?id=75350 [https://perma.cc/AVK7-RXDY] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
147. RESOLUTION 107 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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mandatory continuing legal education (MCLE) to modify their rules
to include, as a separate required credit, programs regarding diversity
and inclusion in the legal profession of all persons, regardless of race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disabilities,
and programs regarding the elimination of bias (“D&I CLE”).148

In 2017, New York State mandated diversity and inclusion
continuing legal education for all attorneys.149 The diversity and
inclusion component to training could be included in judicial
continuing legal education nationwide for all judges as well.150
The Brennan Center, housed at New York University Law
School, likewise recommends implicit bias training for judges, as
well as training for those who are tasked with selecting judges.152
In jurisdictions where judges are not elected, judges are selected
by various nominating groups.153 “Some states mandate or offer
voluntary training for judicial nominating commissioners[,]” as
data indicates that implicit biases can influence who receives an
interview, how candidates are evaluated, and who is ultimately
selected for the judgeship.154
Training for new judges, as well as for sitting judges, is an
important step in decreasing the effects of implicit bias in the
judiciary. This effort can be furthered by the use of IAT scores, as
they can be useful in “[h]elp[ing] newly elected or appointed judges
understand the extent to which they have implicit biases . . . .”155
Specifically, as the Rachlinski Study notes:
[K]nowing a judge’s IAT score might serve two other purposes. First,
it might help newly elected or appointed judges understand the extent
to which they have implicit biases and alert them to the need to

148. LETTS & WOLFE, supra note 146, at 2.
149. See Suchocki, supra note 146.
150. Though some would argue a small amount of training may lead participants to be
overconfident about overcoming bias.
152. See KATE BERRY, BUILDING A DIVERSE BENCH: A GUIDE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSIONERS 7 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Building_Diverse_Bench.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK5N-N8HH].
153. See id.
154. Id. at 2, 7. Judicial nomination commissioners must also be aware of possible
implicit bias in application materials such as cover letters and resumes as observed in the
previously mentioned “resume experiment.” See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 10,
at 991–92.
155. Rachlinski et al., supra note 10, at 1228.
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correct for those biases on the job. Second, it might enable the system
to provide targeted training about bias to new judges.156

Judicial education is common these days, but often requires
more than just education standing alone, unaccompanied “by any
testing of the individual judge’s susceptibility to implicit bias or
any analysis of the judge’s own decisions . . . .”157 Research
demonstrates that “judges are inclined to make the same sorts of
favorable assumptions about their own abilities that non-judges
do.”158
Judge Stewart of Ohio’s Court of Appeals addresses the origins
of implicit bias and posits that it can ultimately be decreased on
the bench.159 In a 2012 opinion, Judge Stewart describes implicit
bias as the result of stereotype formation from one’s upbringing,
which implicitly becomes a part of one’s judicial discretion.160
Although she argues there is no “cure” to eliminating these deeply
hidden ideas, an appreciation of education, as well as discussion
and research on implicit bias, could aid in the awareness, and
possible elimination, of these influences.161
As researcher Masua Sagiv notes: “[t]he Supreme Court [of
Canada] held that, although ‘neutrality does not require judges to
discount their life experiences[,]’ it does prohibit them from basing
(or appearing to base) their judgments ‘on generalizations or
stereotypes’ rather than on the particular evidence and witnesses
that are in front of them.”162

156. Id. (footnotes omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id.; see Sandgrund, supra note 6, at 49, 54 (“Studies have shown that implicit racial
bias is muted by deep friendships across racial lines. Others propose that each of us employ
a ‘bias’ protocol when we become aware of a personal bias: (1) identify the potential bias; (2)
describe the facts of the situation to yourself; (3) consider alternative interpretations; and
(4) choose the interpretation most in line with the facts. Cynthia Mares urges that, ‘[w]e
don’t have to—and we shouldn’t—throw up our hands and say that if the bias is
‘unconscious,’ it cannot be addressed. Studies have shown that people who pay attention to
the assumptions they are making and challenge them can start to change those
assumptions.’” (footnotes omitted)).
159. See State v. Sherman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97840, 2012-Ohio-3958, ¶45
(Stewart, P.J., concurring) (citing Rachlinski et al., supra note 10, at 1221).
160. Id.
161. Id. ¶ 50.
162. Sagiv, supra note 65, at 235 (alteration in original) (quoting R.D.S. v. The Queen,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 487 (Can.)).
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As important as it is to be conscious of one’s own biases as a
method of mitigating the effects of such bias, it is by no means the
only step. As Professor Cynthia Lee noted, “[r]aising awareness of
the possibility of racial bias is a critical first step, but the existing
research suggests educating people about implicit bias is not
sufficient in and of itself to get them to break the prejudice
habit.”163 The ways to decrease bias in bench trials continue to
encourage invention and scholarly studies in the area of implicit
bias. For example, a group of researchers, in outlining seven
strategies to reduce implicit bias in the courtroom, notes that
judges should “[i]dentify distractions and sources of stress in the
decision-making environment and remove or reduce them.”164
Another possible method of decreasing judicial bias is exposure
to stereotype-incongruent modeling, which consists of “taking
affirmative steps to expose decision-makers to situations and
examples that specifically contradict the impressions most
suggested by their implicit biases.”165 For example, if a judge has
negative preconceived notions surrounding a particular race,
“increased exposure to positive examples of that race” may assist
in diminishing the negative conceptions.166
One extremely innovative method to nullify bias in the judiciary
and jury was proposed by Natalie Salmanowitz, a Stanford
professor, who offers the idea of employing virtual reality training
to de-bias finders of fact.167 Professor Salmanowitz proposes the
novel idea of neurointerventions to decrease implicit bias in the
courtroom.168

163. Clair & Winter, supra note 95, at 355 (“As we have shown, a recognition of implicit
bias alone is likely insufficient for countering American racial inequality.”); Lee, supra note
15, at 295.
164. Pamela M. Casey et al., Addressing Implicit Bias in the Courts, 49 CT. REV. 64, 65–
69 (2013) (listing strategy four of seven). The other strategies noted by the researchers were:
“[r]aise awareness of implicit bias”; “[s]eek to identify and consciously acknowledge real
group and individual differences”; “[r]outinely check thought processes and decisions for
possible bias”; “[i]dentify sources of ambiguity in the decision-making context and establish
more concrete standards before engaging in the decision-making process”; “[i]nstitute
feedback mechanisms”; and “[i]ncrease exposure to stigmatized group members and
counter-stereotypes and reduce exposure to stereotypes.” Id.
165. Irwin & Real, supra note 105, at 8–9.
166. Id. at 9.
167. Salmanowitz, supra note 59, at 120.
168. Natalie Salmanowitz, Unconventional Methods for a Traditional Setting: The Use
of Neurointerventions to Reduce Implicit Racial Bias in the Courtroom 2 (2015)
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There are also proven techniques that can be applied in the
courtroom, such as hiring “bias interrupters.”169 Bias interrupters
are “tweaks to basic business systems (hiring, performance
evaluations, assignments, promotions, and compensation) that
interrupt and correct . . . the constant transmission of bias in basic
business systems. Bias [i]nterrupters change systems, not
people.”170 Thus, rather than “rely[ing] on elaborate ‘culture
change’ initiatives[,]” bias interrupters change the systematic
process by which bias leads to discrimination rather than the
source of the bias.171 One organization suggests a three-step
approach: (1) use metrics and data to identify potential bias; (2)
implement bias interrupters to comb through the data to reach
specific findings of bias and how to go about eradicating it; and (3)
repeat as necessary.172
Another group of researchers outline in their law review article
four distinct ways judges can be less biased, such as judges: (1)
doubting their own objectivity; (2) increasing the motivation to
decrease bias; (3) improving the condition of decision-making; and
(4) increasing judicial accountability by counting.173
Professor Tamar Birckhead argues that in order for players in
the legal system to remain ethical and true to their beliefs, judges
should recognize if they are feeling biased and then actively
transcend the bias.174 Professor Birckhead goes further to assert
that the presence of bias in the legal system stems from the fact
that the bench and bar are not yet fully diversified.175
(unpublished M.A. Thesis, Duke University) (on file with Duke University Libraries).
169. Patricia Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Bias: A Prejudice HabitBreaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267, 1268, 1271, 1276 (2013)
(during a twelve-week longitudinal study, researchers found significant reduction in
implicit bias after employing habit-breaking intervention strategies); Williams, supra note
104. But cf. Vivia Chen, Diversity Efforts Are Basically Worthless, AM. LAW. (Sept. 11, 2018,
5:46 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/09/11/diversity-efforts-are-basicallyworthless/ [https://perma.cc/DF9G-JS59] (displaying skepticism of the efficiency of bias
interrupters in curbing the ill effects of bias).
170. See Bias Interrupters Model, BIAS INTERRUPTERS, https://biasinterrupters.org
/about/ [https://perma.cc/9N33-WR6A] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
171. See id.
172. See Tools for Organizations, BIAS INTERRUPTERS, https://biasinterrupters.org/
toolkits/orgtools/ [https://perma.cc/69ER-DA6L] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
173. Kang et al., supra note 3, at 1172–74, 1177–78.
174. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the
Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. REV. 379, 447 (2017).
175. See id. at 455.
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In her article, Masua Sagiv suggests the use of cultural experts
within the court.176 Cultural experts are persons well-versed in the
history of particular societies and cultures, most notably
anthropologists and sociologists.177 Sagiv states that such cultural
experts may “temper the effect of bias by serving as translators
and pushing back against the empirical assumptions that
advocates and jurists make in the course of presenting and hearing
evidence.”178 She goes on further to explain that:
Cultural bias is intrinsic to human nature, and it cannot be
completely eradicated. Therefore, judges must be aware of this bias
even when relying on cultural experts and try as best as possible to
minimize its effects on their decision making. Obtaining this
awareness should start in law school and be reinforced through
professional training programs for jurists and judges.179

Yet, as Sagiv also notes in her research, the use of such cultural
experts—the very tool used to counter implicit bias—may also
create a biased judgment, one even worse than before, due to it
being “disguised as well-informed and objective.”180
As Professor Evan Seamone emphasizes, judges are not the only
professionals who are on “the quest for greater self-awareness.”181
Thus, “a reasonable course of action for judges would be to
exchange ideas with, and borrow tactics from, other professionals
who have a greater familiarity with resolving such problems. Even
though these answers are not tailored specifically to legal problemsolving, they can enhance the process.”182 Professor Seamone urges
judges to engage in the act of journaling to assist judges in
increasing their awareness of such implicit biases.183
A question arises if diversifying the judiciary could reduce
implicit bias. With such critical goals in mind, this article next

176. Sagiv, supra note 65, at 230.
177. Id. at 235.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 256.
180. Id. at 251. Sagiv states that judges may use these cultural experts to rationalize
their preconceived notions and may even “hide the judge’s preexisting cultural agenda.” Id.
at 251–52.
181. Seamone, supra note 61, at 30.
182. Id. at 30–31 (“Just as doctors use the wrong figures when making estimates, so do
judges. Just as language limits doctors’ diagnoses, it similarly limits judicial options. Just
as doctors may see facts as pointing to one distinct answer only to realize that an alternative
view was equally, if not more, permissible, so do judges.” (footnote omitted)).
183. Id. at 68.
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addresses the hypothesis about whether diversifying the judiciary
would have any meaningful effect on minimizing implicit bias.
III. WOULD A JUDGE WHO HAS FACED BIASES IN PERSONAL LIFE
BE MORE AMENABLE TO RECOGNIZING AND MINIMIZING HIS OR
HER OWN IMPLICIT BIASES?
In this next part, I posit a bold hypothesis to be tested: would a
judge who has faced personal bias in his or her own life be more
amenable to recognizing, and thereby decreasing, implicit biases
during trials? Judges who have lived experiences of the reality of
biases are acutely aware of the pernicious effects of bias. Feeling
bias searing into one’s body at an almost cellular, personal level
can perhaps make one more attuned to the feeling of how others
similarly situated may feel. Thus, would that person be more
sensitive to, or at least more willing to minimize, his or her own
biases?
I borrow from various strands of social science literature to
introduce this idea worthy of further research. A judge of color, or
a female judge, or a Muslim judge, or an LGBTQ judge might see
bias in different ways. Intersectionally, taken all together as one
person, a female, Muslim, African American, lesbian judge,184 may
also see bias differently. All of theses judges may be painfully
aware of societal bias and may see implicit biases on a daily basis,
whether in the form of microaggressions or subtle racism or
sexism.185 That judge could perhaps be more amenable to
recognizing her own biases on the bench.
If the first step in reducing implicit biases is to recognize such
biases, this step may come more readily if one has already faced
bias personally. In no way am I suggesting that only particular
types of judges experience bias. A Christian male, heterosexual,
cisgender Caucasian judge may also have faced multiple biases for
various reasons: by virtue of his family structure, his marital
choice, the composition of his family, a disability, his social class,
184. Sagiv, supra note 65, at 231 (“For example, an African-American lesbian woman
belongs to at least three cultural groups, each with its own unique cultural content and
distinct manifestations in the woman’s life.”).
185. Cf. Parks, supra note 116, at 696 (“For instance, a black judge may be explicitly problack but implicitly pro-white, which may influence his or her judgments and behaviors to
an even greater degree.”).
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or a whole host of other reasons. The point in diversifying the
judiciary is just that—it should be diverse in every way—and no
one judge can argue that another judge has never faced bias.186 A
diversified bench might lead to better and informed decision
making as well as reducing bias.187
Yet overall, a richly diverse bench, however diversity is defined,
could bring experiences and perspectives to the table in more
robust ways than may be possible with a less diverse bench.
A. Diversifying the Judiciary
Many who would argue for a more diverse judiciary would point
to the benefits of a comparative, multifaceted understanding of the
law, as opposed to a less diverse, uniform, and singular
understanding of the law.188
At the trial level, diversity on the bench can be meaningful from
a symbolic and substantive place to the litigants, to the public, and
to the courtroom. Academics have written about the value of
diversity at the appellate level, where there is already a process of
group decision making not available in bench trials that may
reduce implicit biases in the case outcome or decision.189 Many
186. See American Judicature Society, Editorial, Judicial Diversity—an Essential
Component of a Fair Justice System, 93 JUDICATURE 180, 180, 182 (2010) (“[Judges]
exchange ideas on and off the bench. A judiciary that is comprised of judges from differing
backgrounds and experiences leads to an interplay and exchange of divergent viewpoints,
which in turn prevents bias, and leads to better, more informed decision making. Diversity
of opinion among decision makers encourages debate and reflection and fosters a
deliberative process that leads to an end product that is greater than the sum of its parts.”).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate
Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 167 (2013) (“Because appellate courts are multimember
courts, with cases decided by panels of judges, individual differences in voting may not
necessarily lead to any differences in case outcomes, due to the fact that a minority judge is
likely to be outnumbered on any given panel. Thus, whether judicial diversity has largescale consequences depends on whether it leads to differences not just in individual voting
by judges but also to differences in case outcomes, which is what litigants care about and
what shapes the development of legal doctrine in a system of stare decisis.” (emphasis
omitted)); Milligan, supra note 134, at 1238 (“Within judicial panels, collegial deliberation
allows alternative conceptions to be aired and passed from judge to judge. As judicial panels
vary over time, this allows further diffusion. On a larger scale, the creation of new
precedents upholding alternative conceptions of equality or fairness alters the legal
framework itself and transmits new conceptions to other judges. At an informal level, judges
may share their views on political morality via conversation at conferences and commentary
in legal journals.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Sherilynn A. Ifill, Judicial Diversity, 13
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researchers have persuasively argued “why diversity matters”
beyond the optics,190 and why a diverse team of players increases
the intelligence, the innovation, and the loyalty of the group.191
Reasons garnered from various studies and surveys include:
[A] judiciary that is representative of the population’s diversity
increases public confidence in the courts[, and] . . . a diverse bench
provides decision-making power to formerly disenfranchised
populations. . . . [T]he diversity of the bench is linked to broader
issues of representation, as “some scholars assert that judicial
legitimacy is increased with enhanced levels of nontraditional judges,
as their decisions are more infused with ‘traditionally excluded
perspectives’ and their presence enhances the appearance of
impartiality for [both] litigants . . . and for the public at large.”192

As observed in a NYSBA Report:
Yet it is more than just the perception of fairness that impacts judicial
efficacy. It is the actual quality of justice that suffers when judicial
diversity is lacking. Although we know this intuitively, empirical
studies have also confirmed that diverse judges decide certain types
of cases differently than their white male colleagues and that minority
and female judges on appellate benches can also influence the
decisions of their colleagues and improve the collective decisionmaking process.
In short, judicial diversity is essential because it provides equal
opportunity to underrepresented groups, presents role models to
encourage our youth, inspires confidence in our justice system and,
most importantly, promotes justice.193

Judge Jenny Rivera, another New York Court of Appeals Judge,
notes194 the myriad reasons why diversity on the bench matters,
including reasons such as: symbolism, role modeling, increase of
public confidence in the administration of justice, and creation of
GREEN BAG 2D 45 (2009) (describing the importance of judicial diversity to public trust).
190. Marouf, supra note 48, at 446–47 (“[I]ncreasing the [Board of Immigration Appeals’]
diversity by appointing more female members and people of color could help reduce implicit
bias. The gender balance of the BIA, in particular, merits closer examination in exploring
ways to reduce implicit bias, since female IJs grant asylum at a rate that is 44% higher than
their male colleagues.” (footnotes omitted)).
191. See Williams, supra note 104.
192. MALIA REDDICK ET AL., AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, EXAMINING DIVERSITY ON STATE
COURTS: HOW DOES THE JUDICIAL SELECTION ENVIRONMENT ADVANCE—AND INHIBIT—
JUDICIAL DIVERSITY? 1 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=273
1012 [https://perma.cc/QFH3-GAM6].
193. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL DIVERSITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 2 (2014), https://
www.nysba.org/Sections/Judicial/2014_Judicial_Diversity_Report.html [https://perma.cc/8
TC7-5NMF].
194. Jenny Rivera, Diversity and the Law, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1271, 1271 (2016).
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an environment supporting a popular belief that the system is
fair.195 She explains further that we need to recognize that some
members of our population believe there can be no justice if they
do not see someone like themselves in positions of power and
influence.196
On the topic of symbolism, Judge Rivera cites a report that
discusses the importance of having a diverse bench, because it
creates increased levels of trust and perceived government
legitimacy in the judiciary.197 Goals of diversity in the judiciary
are, as the report claims, important on the symbolic level, but also
on the substantive level of legal decisions, because a more
heterogeneous set of differences on the judiciary will yield more
balance, access, and equal opportunity for individuals from any
walk of life who come before a court.198 As further supported by
Professor Nancy Scherer, “the placement of black judges on the . . .
bench is vital because it sends a message to black citizens that
they, too, have access to positions of influence. . . . [T]hey provide
substantive representation of black perspectives in the . . .
courts.”199
In terms of gender diversity, one area where researchers often
see a disparity in substantive voting behavior between male and
female judges is Title VII sexual harassment and sexual
discrimination cases.200 Judge Edward Chen, the first Asian
Pacific American judge on the federal bench for the Northern
District of California,202 has also written on the topic of the need
for diversity on the bench, writing:
195. Id. at 1274.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1275 (quoting DINA REFKI ET AL., CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOV’T & CIVIL SOC’Y,
WOMEN IN FEDERAL AND STATE-LEVEL JUDGESHIPS 1 (2011)).
198. Id.
199. Nancy Scherer, Blacks on the Bench, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 655, 656 (2004).
200. Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1776 (2005). Although
research does vary on the topic, data collected by Jennifer Peresie shows that although
plaintiffs lost in a majority of cases, such plaintiffs had a noticeably higher chance of
succeeding where a female judge was on the bench. Id. at 1779. This finding is further
supported by research conducted by Matthew Knepper and research by Christina Boyd, Lee
Epstein, and Andrew Martin. Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex
on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 401 (2010); Matthew Knepper, When the Shadow Is the
Substance: Judge Gender and the Outcomes of Workplace Sex Discrimination Cases, 36 J.
LAB. ECON. 623, 659 (2018).
202. Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice For All, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
1109, 1110 (2003).
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Diversity can establish the credibility of an institution, build bridges
to other communities, and increase sensitivity to and awareness of
diverse clientele and constituents . . . .
....
At the same time, diversity provides role models for those
historically excluded. It can provide a source of hope and inspiration
for those who would otherwise limit their horizons and aspirations.
....
A diverse judiciary signals the public acknowledgment of historically
excluded communities and sends an invaluable message of inclusion.
It enhances courts’ credibility among affected communities who would
otherwise feel they have no voice within the institution. It helps dispel
traditional stereotypes that Asian Pacific Americans and other
minorities are not sufficiently intelligent, articulate, or decisive to be
judges. And it assures students and young lawyers from historically
underrepresented communities that they need not limit their
aspirations.
Of course, as with any other institution, diversity also enhances the
quality of judicial decision making.203

Judge Bertha Wilson of Canada mentions yet another reason
why diversity on the bench matters. Specifically, she found that
having more women on the bench lessened sexist remarks and
inappropriate language in the courtroom.204 Judge Wilson bases
her conclusions about professionalism in the courtroom, in part,
upon data gathered by New York and New Jersey task forces on
gender bias.205 Furthermore, researcher Angela Melville addresses
the importance of female inclusion into the judiciary.206 Melville
suggests that such gender diversity is necessary in order to bring
a gendered perspective to judging (having different experiences
and ways of understanding the law and other social constructs),207
that it is a “basic tenet of democracy”208 in that having more women
on the bench better represents the demographics of those whom

203.
204.
205.

Id. at 1116–17.
See Wilson, supra note 112, at 513.
Id. at 514 (citing REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL DIVERSITY TO
GOVERNOR CUOMO (1991), reprinted in Joaquin G. Avila, The Future of Voting Rights
Litigation: Judicial and Community College Board Elections, 6 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 127,
129–31 (1993)).
206. Angela Melville, Evaluating Judicial Performance and Addressing Gender Bias, 4
OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 880, 884 (2014).
207. See id.
208. Id. at 888.
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judges serve and that it also provides a symbolic role in that female
inclusion “ensure[s] public confidence in the judiciary.”209
If a diverse bench could increase public confidence in the judicial
system,210 it may suggest to a litigant that decisions will reflect a
diverse understanding of situations in society. As a service to the
public, and theoretically a reflection of public opinion, the law
reflects the ideal of fairness when exercised. In reality, however,
the law’s objectivity can become mired in various ways. This can
give the perception of a monolithic institution of the law that only
serves the interests of the majority or is not representative of
minority groups. Ideally, the legal system and the law should
reflect the entire society it represents.
B. Why Might a Diverse Judiciary Reduce Bias?
Beginning with the assumption that the legal system ideally
should reflect all of society,211 this then leads to my next question,
where I urge further empirical research on the topic of implicit
bias. Would a judge who has lived the reality of bias be uniquely
positioned to recognize bias more readily when seeing it in the
courtroom? Or, put differently, would a judge who has faced bias
be more prone to see bias exhibited in a court?
Regarding gender diversity in the judiciary, Sherilynn Ifill
writes:
[N]obody is just a woman or a man. Each of us is a person with
experiences that affect our view of law and life and decision-making.
Nevertheless, as “‘outsiders’ in the American legal system,’ women
judges are uniquely positioned to recognize, engage, and legitimate
outsider narratives in the deliberative process.212

209. Id. at 889.
210. See generally Letter from John S. Kiernan to Judge Betty Weinberg Ellerin, supra
note 106 (“Studies [of the legal field] have demonstrated that diversity in staffing promotes
differences in perspective that enhance professional performance.”); Kevin R. Johnson &
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the
Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 10 (2004).
211. MICHAEL E. MORRELL, EMPATHY AND DEMOCRACY: FEELING, THINKING, AND
DELIBERATION 1 (2010) (“There is a promise inherent in democracy: before a society makes
decisions that it will use its collective power to enforce, it will give equal consideration to
everyone in the community. The development of collective decision-making institutions that
take into consideration a wider range of interests did not begin with the rise of modern
democracies.”).
212. Ifill, supra note 124, at 448–49 (quoting Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has
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Ultimately, race, gender, sexual preference, and other identity
characteristics are not proxies for how one might view a case, and
being of a particular race or gender does not automatically make
one more sympathetic to those of the same race or gender. In other
words, we can never assume that all women judges will see certain
types of cases one way, or that all African American judges will
decide uniformly.213 There is no monolithic view of any particular
judge. All judges need to be mindful of their own idiosyncratic
biases, which is especially true when a judge believes he or she is
not biased toward a particular group. Indeed, some would argue
that female judges are less sympathetic to female litigants or
issues regarding gender, as they may be judging such litigants as
to how they themselves would have acted in a similar situation.214
That said, the lived reality of a judge is often the view that
ultimately shapes how that judge sees a case.
Diversity should be examined through the lens of
intersectionality.215 Many litigants and lawyers who appear before
the judiciary have multiple aspects of their identity—a black
lesbian woman, for example. Likewise, the judiciary itself may also
include individuals who identify with more than one group, and
therefore possess a unique perspective on the issues before
them.216 Intersectionality addresses how these various aspects of a
person comprise a complex, nuanced individual not to be
essentialized into a particular group, stereotype, or monolithic
mold.217 Thus, when addressing diversifying the judiciary in this

Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 489, 494 (1984)).
213. Id. at 409–10 (“In so doing, diversity advocates need not, and indeed should not,
argue that the African American community is monolithic in its configuration, views, or
values, or that only one ‘black perspective’ exists. Essentializing African American
communities or judges denies the richness and complexity of African American political
thought.”).
214. See FENTIMAN, supra note 132, at 191; Breger, supra note 17, at 564–66;
Czapanskiy, supra note 132, at 252–53.
215. Crenshaw, supra note 21, at 1244 (defining “intersectionality”).
216. Todd Collins & Laura Moyer, Gender, Race, and Intersectionality on the Federal
Appellate Bench, 61 POL. RES. Q. 219, 225 (2008) (concluding that minority female judges
are significantly more likely to support criminal defendants’ claims than minority male,
Caucasian female, and Caucasian male colleagues).
217. See James Andrew Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur, Judicial Diversity: Where
Independence and Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REV. 775, 789 (2004) (“However, it is
generally difficult for a homogenous judiciary of affluent white men to understand and
explain the socially diverse realities of poverty, race, and gender.”).
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article, I am speaking about increasing diversity on a number of
levels.
We also need to be mindful that diversity exists even within
particular groups. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor once explained:
“[n]o one person, judge or nominee will speak in a female or [a]
people of color voice.”218 This is true for any culture, gender, ability,
or religion. There are wide variations within any particular group.
As Professor Sherilynn Ifill notes in her law review article: “[i]t
must also be recognized that despite common cultural connections,
great diversity exists within the African American community as
well.”219 One can never assume a particular viewpoint on any topic
just based upon a person’s identity. That being said, Ifill goes on to
explain, “[i]ndividual African Americans cannot help but be aware
of the history that links all African Americans to one another. Nor
can African Americans deny the reality that present day racism
continues to connect the collective future of all African
Americans.”220
With that being said, diversity on the bench potentially opens
up the range of perspectives.221 It can be argued that reform
towards a diverse judiciary would promote systematic reform on
multiple grounds beyond simply eliminating ideological biases.
Again, if the goal is to minimize implicit biases, then we need to
look at bias more globally.
Notably, Professor Nicole Negowetti speculates that implicit
bias may actually be one reason why the bench is not as diverse as
it should be.222 While some researchers have suggested that
implicit biases are more evident when we have a non-diversified
bench, others disagree.223 Some have argued that the justice

218. Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, Judge, Fed. Court of Appeals, Judge Mario G. Olmos
Memorial Lecture at UC Berkeley School of Law Symposium: Raising the Bar (Oct. 26,
2001), https://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2009/05/26_sotomayor.shtml [https://
perma.cc/ZF9A-ERQH].
219. Ifill, supra note 124, at 420.
220. Id. at 422.
221. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
969, 986 (2006) (discussing that elimination of implicit bias can create interdependence
among all group members and create accountability for decision makers’ decisions).
222. See Negowetti, supra note 22, at 951–52.
223. Rivera, supra note 194, at 1276 (“Some data supports the argument that judges of
different races, ethnicities, and genders may reach different conclusions. Some data finds
no support for such a conclusion.”).
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system rewards those who conform to acceptable norms before a
judge.224 Diversifying the bench gives the possibility of
ascertaining multiple norms for any individual to be accounted for
in the legal system.225 Implicit bias can further permeate the court
system without the input of a multitude of judicial viewpoints.226
Some researchers posit that judicial diversity can itself be a
remedy to counter implicit bias; the creation of a diverse bench
introduces ideas that were once viewed as foreign to becoming the
norm in decision making.227 For example, assembling a judiciary
from a cross section of society will reflect a judicial approach that
is representative of an entire nation’s people.228 As explained by
researchers Pat Chew and Robert Kelley: “[a] more integrated
judiciary that is representative of American society would expand
judicial perspectives, prompt a more deliberative process, and help
assure more accountable and responsive decision-making for
‘citizens of all walks of life,’ thus facilitating a more fullyfunctioning democracy.”229
Indeed, this concept does not rest on the physical attributes of
the judge, but instead pivots on the views of the individual judge
and perhaps the bias an individual judge may have experienced.230
A court may then approach the case before it from a broader set of
experiences, as opposed to the commonly held perception of the law

224. Birckhead, supra note 174, at 413.
225. Rivera, supra note 194, at 1280.
226. Birckhead, supra note 174, at 419; see Rivera, supra note 194, at 1274 (“Justice
cannot be blind if it is imparted by a group that overwhelmingly shares a common
experience and appearance to the exclusion of others.”).
227. MILLS, supra note 145, at 23; N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 193, at 6; Johnson
& Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 210, at 10; Wynn & Mazur, supra note 217, at 783 (“Thus,
judicial impartiality is not the absence of experience[,] but rather the presence of human
experience coupled with an open mind. Accordingly, in our pursuit to attain an independent
and impartial judiciary, we cannot escape the reality—and consequences—that each judge
brings to the bench a sum of life experience.”).
228. See Jerome McCristal Cuip, Jr., Voice, Perspective, Truth, and Justice: Race and the
Mountain in the Legal Academy, 38 LOY. L. REV. 61, 63–64 (1992). For insight into how
critical race theory is defined and how it manifests in an academic setting, see id. See also
Anthony Paul Farley, Lacan & Voting Rights, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN., 283, 290–91 (2001)
(discussing the immersive impact of judicial opinions through the lens of critical race
theory).
229. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The Realism of Race in Judicial Decision Making:
An Empirical Analysis of Plaintiffs Race and Judges’ Race, 28 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC
JUST. 91, 115 (2012).
230. See id.
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that is ruled upon by a narrow section of the population. As one
researcher has noted:
Implicit social cognition research indicates that implicit bias in
decision makers can be reduced through exposure to individuals who
are different from us. In other words, diversity is not only a result of
a less biased workplace, profession, and legal system, but it is also a
means of deactivating and countering stereotypes and implicit
biases.231

Thus, perhaps diversifying the judiciary has an additional
benefit: increasing the number of individuals who may readily
embrace the idea of openly addressing and decreasing implicit
biases in judging. This is, in fact, the genesis for my urging of
actual quantitative research in this area.
Additionally, would a litigant of color or a litigant oppressed in
any number of ways hold a perception that like-minded or
similarly situated judges may be more empathetic to him/herself,
and thus more empathetic to his or her case more broadly? Would
such a litigant be more comfortable in the courtroom or be more
apt to comply with any resulting court order?232
Of course, it must be noted that there exist minority group
judges making legal claims contrary to minority interests, such as
many commentators might say of United States Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas.233 Some have argued that Thomas’
judicial decisions are in fact antithetical to minority interests, as
could also be the case for other judges of color or who are otherwise
diverse.234 Such voices and experiences as minority
representatives are nonetheless imperative regardless of court

231. Negowetti, supra note 22, at 951–52 (footnote omitted).
232. Breger, supra note 2, at 3; Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 210, at 29
(demonstrating that it is in the interests of the judiciary to compel community respect, as
opposed to being viewed as an illegitimate “kangaroo court”).
233. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 210, at 14–15, 47. In Johnson and FuentesRohwer’s reference to Justice Thomas, they also cite the decision of Grutter v. Bollinger, the
landmark Supreme Court decision providing the use of affirmative action in student
admissions as a compelling state interest in furthering educational goals. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003). Justice Thomas was among the four votes cast in
dissent. Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
234. See Mary Kate Kearney, Justice Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger: Can Passion Play
a Role in a Jurist’s Reasoning?, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 15, 32–34 (2004) (explaining that
Justice Thomas did not vote in favor of affirmative action in Bollinger; however, his own
experiences with affirmative action “strengthen[] his voice in the debate”).
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outcomes. Again, there is a wide range of possibilities here, which
deserves further empirical research.
Another current Supreme Court Justice, then a federal circuit
court judge, Sonia Sotomayor, addressed the issue of judges
drawing from their life experiences when speaking with Berkeley
Law students—thereafter catapulting to fame the phrase “a wise
Latina woman.”235 Quoting our great Justice, who contends that
the gender and ethnicity of a judge can alter judicial decision
making:
Personal experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see. My
hope is that I will take the good from my experiences and extrapolate
them further into areas with which I am unfamiliar. I simply do not
know exactly what that difference will be in my judging. But I accept
there will be some based on my gender and my Latina heritage.
....
Each day on the bench I learn something new about the judicial
process and about being a professional Latina woman in a world that
sometimes looks at me with suspicion. I am reminded each day that I
render decisions that affect people concretely and that I owe them
constant and complete vigilance in checking my assumptions,
presumptions and perspectives and ensuring that to the extent that
my limited abilities and capabilities permit me, that I reevaluate
them and change as circumstances and cases before me requires. I can
and do aspire to be greater than the sum total of my experiences[,] but
I accept my limitations. I willingly accept that we who judge must not
deny the differences resulting from experience and heritage but
attempt, as the Supreme Court suggests, continuously to judge when
those opinions, sympathies and prejudices are appropriate.236

C. How Could Experiencing Personal Prejudice Be Relevant to
Reducing Implicit Bias in the Courtroom?
The effects of bias are lasting and pernicious. Those who have
experienced prejudice personally “might experience shame, anger,
sadness, withdrawal or an increase in motivation to make
changes,” notes sociology professor Laurie Mulvey.237 Researcher
Michael Inzlicht notes in a psychological study:

235. Sotomayor, supra note 218.
236. Id.
237. Lucie Couillard, The Impact of Prejudice on Society, DAILY COLLEGIAN (Sept. 27,
2013), https://www.collegian.psu.edu/news/crime_courts/article_a86ea0dc-270a-11e3-ad900019bb30f31a.html [https://perma.cc/Y4EP-WKHC].
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People who felt they were discriminated against[—]whether based on
gender, age, race or religion[—]all experienced significant impacts
even after they were removed from the situation.
....
These lingering effects hurt people in a very real way, leaving them
at a disadvantage[.] [E]ven many steps removed from a prejudicial
situation, people are carrying around this baggage that negatively
impacts their lives.238

If an individual has been subject to personal bias, will that
individual be more motivated or more amenable to curbing bias in
general? Would that individual be more cognizant of his or her own
biases personally or professionally? Would that individual be more
sensitive to the pernicious effects of bias upon decision making? If
the answers to these questions are “yes” and that individual is in
fact a judge, would that not mean that diversifying the judiciary
might reduce implicit biases?
There is no conclusive answer yet about whether or not one who
has suffered in the context of certain prejudices may be a better
evaluator of individuals who have suffered similar prejudices.
Many would argue, however, that a judge who clearly expresses
“empathy” or “understanding” with a cause is more suitable to take
a more exacting stance to claims where a prejudice is involved, as
opposed to a judge who is not equipped with such emotional
capacity.239 The concept of empathy in the legal discourse comes
with the benefit of enlarging one’s understanding and hearing
issues differently, which can ultimately reshape how legal
problems are addressed.240 A judge should be able to listen to
stories and guide application of the law from a holistic
standpoint.241

238. April Kemick, Stereotyping Has Lasting Negative Impact, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 12,
2010), https://www.usnews.com/science/articles/2010/08/12/stereotyping-has-lasting-negati
ve-impact [https://perma.cc/NNM2-AJ9A].
239. See, e.g., Denny Chin, Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1561,
1562, 1564–65 (2012) (discussing President Obama’s observation that “empathy” is an
essential facet of a judge’s understanding and identifying with individuals).
240. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1577 (1987).
But cf. Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit Bias?, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2015,
at 20, 21. Marks’ own experiences of facing prejudice did not necessarily help eradicate her
own implicit biases in the courtroom, “I remember thinking that, as a victim of bias myself,
I would be particularly sensitive and skilled at detecting my own implicit bias and knowing
how to neutralize it.” Id.
241. See Note, Being Atticus Finch: The Professional Role of Empathy, in To Kill a
Mockingbird, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1684–85 (2004).
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The hypothesis of whether those judges who maintain empathy
to litigants who appear before them are more capable of sound
rulings than those judges who lack empathy must be tested by
interdisciplinary quantitative or qualitative research. It is worth
exploring further if the presence in the judiciary of those who
believe that they have faced bias—any kind of bias—might help
decrease bias in the overall legal system.
This article ends with the hope and challenge that these
questions be explored scientifically. If the conclusion, after study
and data, is that those judges who have experienced bias in life are
more amenable to interrupting their own biases on the bench is
“yes,” then that is yet one more additional reason why diversifying
the judiciary can benefit our larger society and the legal system.
CONCLUSION
In sum, judges must be mindful of the inevitable implicit biases
they harbor, as every human admittedly does. If judges could be
made aware of their particularized implicit biases, they may be
successful in minimizing these biases from seeping into their own
decision making. Furthermore, as this article outlines, there are a
whole host of other strategies for judges to try to reduce their
implicit biases. Thinking even beyond such strategies, perhaps
judges who have faced personal biases in their own lived
experiences would more readily or more honestly embrace the
exercise of reducing implicit bias and seek more insight into the
effect that implicit bias has upon their case decisions. There are
numerous reasons why diversifying the judiciary is a benefit to
society as a whole. Reducing bias may be yet one additional and
invaluable benefit to strive toward. Research awaits.

